On the monitoring device (just run it on your computer if you just want to This will open an HTTP server on port 4422. Stuff that would probably improve the accuracy and speed a lot. This is really just a simple one-day-project implementation without any sophisticated Then, he scans all the decodedĭata for the bits he sent to the user to find out which user connected to his server Stream back into bits using the data burst encoding. The attacker measures the traffic of all possible users and decodes every TCP data The server then sends those data bursts back to Of data bursts – simplified, a zero becomes "first data, then nothing" and a oneīecomes "first nothing, then data".
#Active tor links 64 bits#
In my implementation, the attacking server can encode 64 bits into a pattern The webserver owner only needs to save theĦ4-bit ID he generated, the traffic analysis attacker needs to save one bit every fourĪlso, it is NOT required that the victim's browser supports JavaScript or so. Who decide to collaborate after-the-fact. Runs the passive traffic analysis near the users – they can be two distinct attackers It is NOT required, however, that the webserver is run by the same attacker who also The attacking machines have their time synced over NTP or so An attacker can measure the internet traffic of all possible users (in my implementation, he controls the webserver)
An attacker controls the webserver or the exit node (or something between them) Long enough (a bit over 4 minutes in my implementation) The user points his browser to an attacker's webserver and stays on that server So, this is a known problem, but I wanted to see how easy it really is to do this,Īnd I wanted to try it myself, so I built a PoC. That page also links to this really scary paper: Hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then Traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to learn whom to investigate,īut Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation (also known asĮnd-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm a
The way we generally explain it is that Tor tries to protect against Or measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic
The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see The Tor developers are aware of issues like this – This is a very simple implementation of an active timing attack on Tor. By Thread PoC: End-to-end correlation for Tor connections using an active timing attack
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